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President Reagan’s State of the Union and Budget Messages called for
sweeping changes in federal-state fiscal relatlons and service-providing
responsibilities. Under the banner, “New Federalism”, the President’s
proposals continue a dialogue on federal-state relations that goes back
to the very roots of our country. The Federalist Papers, written by our
revolutionary founding fathers, dealt with this issue, as have innumerable
scholarly papers and Presidential commissions since.
Probably no one expects Mr. Reagan’s proposals to be adopted without
change, and many details have yet to be worked out. Nonetheless, the po-
tential impact of this transformation warrants careful study.
How would Minnesota fare under the New Federalism? The principal
objective of this report is to attempt to answer that question. The report
focuses on the net fiscal impact of the New Federalism on state finances --
an especially important question in this time of heightened concern over
the state’s budget problems. A major finding 1s that one cannot assume
that because the program may have a beneficial effect on state government
finances, that it WIII necessarily be beneficial to all Minnesotans.
* Members of the Task Force were Glenn Nelson (chin.),Wilbur Maki,
Thomas Stinson, Arley Waldo, and Carole Yoho. Kim Holschuh pro-
vided administrative and secretarial assistance to the Task Force.2
l Minnesota state government would benefit substantially from the New
Federalism if the Admmlstratlon’s assumptions on relat~ve program costs
hold . Simulations of the impact of the Reagan proposal on the state’s
finances indicate that in 1993 the combination of savings from federal
assumption of Medicaid and the additional excise tax revenue made avail-
able to the state would total more than $563 million more than the coats
of the programs returned to the state for funding.
l Minnesota would not have as large a surplus under alternative assumptions
about future spending levels for Medicaid, Food Stamps, AFDC, and the
programs returned to the state from the federal level. Under some assump-
tions Minnesota could actually see negative fiscal Impacts -- expected
costs greater than savings plus additional excise tax revenues -- of $111
million, $140 million, and $41 million m 1988, 1989, and 1990, respectively.
Even under this scenario, however, state government would have a net gain
of $201 million in 1993.
l Minnesota’s benefits could be largely illusory. Under some assumptions,
the President’s program could smnply sh~ft expenditures away from both the
federal and state government and onto local governments and those prxvate
citizens currently receiving Medicaid, AFDC, or Food Stamp benefits.
The assumption that the federal Medxcaid program will maintain the current
benefit structure for Minnesotans is crucial. Medica~d benefits per
recipient in Minnesota are second highest among the 50 states. Any
reduction of Medicaid benefits from existing state levels would reduce
Medicaid savings to Minnesota citizens and lessen net benef~ts. The
response of state policymakers to federal reductions m Medicaid payments
relative to historical levels in Mznnesota would determine who would
bear the burden. If the state chooses to supplement federal funds in3
order to maintain benefit levels, Minnesota taxpayers will find their
tax burden rising above that implicit in the Reagan proposal. If the
state chooses not to supplement federal Medicaid funds, letting benefit
levels fall, Medicaid recipients will bear the burden. If Minnesota’s
benefit levels in 1980 would have been reduced to the level of average
benefits for all states in 1980, the difference would have been over
$200 million.
s New Federalism may create hardships for some local governments. States
may force portions of their newly acquired responsibilities onto local
governments, without appropriating the funds necessary for implemen-
tation. Some funds now passed directly from the federal level to local
governments may be given to, and held by, state governments.
THE REAGAN PROPOSAL
The President’s plan has two distinct parts. The first, often re-
ferred to as the “Swap” component, calls for a trade of social welfare
programs. States would assume full responsibility for administering and
funding Food Stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Ch~ldren (AFDC)_.
In return, the federal government would take over the Medicaid program.
The second part of the proposal, the “Turnback” component, would give the
states responsibility for 44 programs currently funded by the federal gov-
ernment, while at the same the releasing certain federal excise taxes for
state use.
Analyzing the impacts of the President’s proposal within this two-part
framework is convenient. The two parts are, however, not independent.
From 1984 to 1987 the Turnback program and the accompanying trust fund pro-
vide the balancing mechanism through which states are compensated for losses4
(or penalized for gains) from the Swap.
the trust fund, there would be no way to
In the absence of a device such as
prevent some states from losing and
others from gaming from the Swap. Later, after the trust fund is phased
out, both the savings from the Swap programs and the additional excise tax
revenue are needed if the Turnback programs are to be fully funded. Thus ,
although the two programs will initially be discussed separately, their
fiscal impact will depend on their combined effect.
Medicaid/Public Assistance Swap
The Admmistratlon’s proposal offers a major financial benefit to the
states. The federal government would assume the full cost of Medicaid.
This program, which finances health care for needy people of all ages, IS a
major budget item and is expected to continue Its rapid growth. In FY 1980,
the most recent year for which complete state and local expend~ture data are
available, state and local expend~tures for Med~cald totaled about $10
bllllon, equaling 21 percent of then publlc welfare costs ($47 billion)
and 3 percent of their total budgets ($369 billion).~’ From FY 1980 to FY
1982 estunated federal Medicaid outlays increased nearly 30 percent_
(from $14 billlon to $18 billion).z’ In Minnesota growth of state and local ex-
penditures for Medicaid was even more rapid, 35 percent, going from $251 million
Al State and local budgets - Council of Economic Adv~sers, Annual Report
transmitted with the Economic Report of the President, Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 323; Medicaid - Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, Executive OffIce of the President, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 1982, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1982, p. 235, and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re-
lations, “Staff Br~efing Report o; ‘New Federalism’ In~tlatlves,”
photocopy, Washington, D.C., March 1982, p. 3-16.
2/ OMB, Budget, N 1982, ~ cit., p. 235, and Office of Management and —
Budget, Executive Office of the president, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year, 1983, Washington: Government Prlntlng Office
1982, p. 5-130. 95
m FY 1980 to $340 milllon in FY 1982.2’ Currently, Medicaid costs in
Minnesota are shared by the federal (56 percent), state (40 percent) and
local (4 percent) levels of government.<’




would assume, also starting in FY 1984, the full cost of two major
assistance programa, Food Stamps and AFDC. The Food Stamp program
federally financed but administered by states. The cost of AFDC in
Minnesota, as with Medicaid, is currently shared by federal (54 percent),
state (38 percent), 5/ and local (8 percent) governments.— Nationally, federal






represented 17 percent of total federal grants to states
34 percent of the public welfare costs of states and
growth from FY 1980 to FY 1982 of federal grants for
is estimated to be 21 percent
State and local expenditures
(recall that Food Stamps are federally financed)
(from $16.4 billion to
in Mnnesota for AFDC
have Increased 23 percent,
from $79 million in FY 1980 to an estunated $97 million m N 1982.5’
Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, St. Paul, personal communica-
tion.
Ibid., FY 1982 estimates.
Ibid.
Food Stamps and AFDC - OMB, Budget, FY 1982, ~ cit., pp. 402 and 448;
state and local budgets - CEA, ~ cit.; federal grants to states and
localities - OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
1983: Special Analysia H, Federal Ald to State and Local Governments,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 17.
o~, Budget, l?y1982, ~ cit., pp. 402 and 448; OMB, Budget, Fy 1983,
*cIt., pp. 8-35 and 8-70.
Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, personal communication.6
The Reagan Administration proJects that the Swap wII1 be beneficial to
states in the aggregate. Administration estimates are for state Medicaid
outlays of $19.1 billion and federal Food Stamp and AFDC program costs (to
be absorbed by states) of $16.5 billion in FY 1984. Thus, the estimated
state savings from the Swap are $2.6 billion.
For Minnesota, the Administration estimates the Swap would lead to net
savings of $299 million in FY 1984. The savings from the federal assump-
tion of Medicaid are estimated to be $501 million while costs of absorbing
the Food Stamp and AFDC programs are $202 million. Based upon FY 1982 ex-
penditures and recent trends, the Administration’s estimates for FY 1984
appear reasonable for Minnesota. A critical assumption underlying the es-
timate of impacts on Minnesota state government 1s that the federal govern-
ment will fund Medicaid at a level consistent with that currently existing
In the state.
The proJected savings for the states depend heavdy upon the Adminis-
tration’s assumptions that the cost of Medicaid will continue to grow at a
relatively rapid rate, while funding levels for Food Stamps and AFDC de-
cline. There is general agreement with the Medicaid assumption.z’ Many
question, however, whether the Food Stamp and AFDC programs will diminish.
In FY 1982 Food Stamp outlays are projected to be $11.5 bllllon and AFDC
outlays to be $8.3 b~llion, for a total of $19.8 million.~’ The total
federal outlays for the two programs in FY 1984 are projected to be only
$16.5 billion. Thus, the Administration’s estimates of the Swap program’s
~/ For example, see National Governor’s Association, The Proposed pY 1983
Federal Budget: Impact on the States, Washington, D.C., February 1982,
pp. 42-3.
10/ OMB, Budget, N 1983, ~ cit., pp. 8-35 and 8-70. —7
impact are based on an assumption of a decline of $3.3 billion (17 percent)
in outlays m nominal dollars over the next two yea~s. Using the Adminlstra-
tlon’s inflation forecasts of 5.1 percent in 1983 and 4.7 percent m 1984,~’
the decline in constant 1982 dollars is from $19.8 billion in FY 1982 to
$15.0 billion in FY 1984 -- a drop of $4.8 billion or 24 percent.
of precedent for such a drop causes some observers to believe that
budget cuts are not politically feasible. The impacts on states of







The New Federalism would also give states full responsibility for ad-
ministering and funding 44 existing federal programs. A Ilst of the pro-
grams the Administration suggested be included is given in Appendix Table A.
Projected FY 1984 expenditures for the Turnback programs total $30.2 billion.
These expenditures, by functional area, include the following:%’
Functional Area
Income assistance
Social, health, and nutrition services
Education and training
Transportation
Community development and facilities
Revenue sharing and technical assistance
Turnback Programs
Total Projected









11/ Consumer Price Index. fourth auarter over fourth auarter. as stated In —. , L
OMB, Budget, FY 1983, ~ c~t., pp. 2-5 and 2-7.
.
12/ White House, “The President’s Federalism Initiat~ve: Basic Framework,” —
Washington, D.C., January 26, 1982, p. 8.8
Table 1
Net Impact of the Medicaid/Public Assistance Swap on States as an Aggrega~e




Assumed Change in Food Stamp and AFDC Loss Gain
Outlays, from FY 1982 to N 1984 (billions, 1982 dollars)
Reagan Administration projection --- 2.4
(Decline of 24 percent in real dollars)
No change in nominal outlays 0.6 ---
(Decline of 10 percent m real dollars)
Increase outlays to keep pace with inflation 2.5 ---
(No change in real dollars)
Maintain FY 1980 - 1982 trend in real terms 3.3 ---
(Increase of 4 percent in real dollars)
Adjustments for mflatlon based on the Consumer Price Index, fourth quarter
over fourth quarter, as stated in OMB, Budget, FY 1983, ~ cit., pp. 2-5
and 2-7.9
Based upon Administration projections of total federal grant-in-aid outlays
to states and localities of $82 billion in N 1984, the Turnback programs




until 1991. States would
turned back,although some
enforced.
would be phased in gradually, not taking full effect
not be required to continue all federal programs
passthrough of funds to local government would be
Revenues to support the programs transferred to the states would come from
two sources -- the savings accruing from the Swap program and from new state
taxes replacing existing federal excise taxes. After a transition period,
current federal excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco would be phased out, as
would $.02 of the existing $.04 per gallon gasoline tax. These taxes, as
well as the one percent






excise tax on telephone service scheduled to expire
by the states without increasing the total (federal
the Turnback program would produce a major redefinition of
between federal and state government, a transition period
respon-
is
ease the change. During fiscal years 1984-1987, all revenues
from the federal alcohol, tobacco, and telephone excise taxes; $.02 per
gallon of the federal gasoline tax; and a major portion of the windfall pro-
fits tax would go to a trust fund. The windfall profits tax is expected to
provide almost 60 percent ($16.7 billion) of the trust fund’s annual revenues
of $28 billion. Gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol
contribute $2.2 billion, $2.7 billzon, and $6.1
13/ OMB, Budget, FY 1983: Spec~al Analysis H, —
excise taxes are expected to
billion,respectively, while
+cit., p. 17.10
the telephone excise would provide the trust fund with approximately $.3
billion per year. Current federal excise tax rates are given in Appendix
Table B; Minnesota’s existing excise taxes on alcohol, gasolne and tobacco
are shown in Appendix Table C.
The trust fund would be distributed among the states based on their per-
centage share of receipts from the 44 Turnback programs during 1979-81.
Each state’s share of the fund would, however, be reduced or increased to
balance out any gain or loss due to the AFDC/Food Stamp-Medlcald Swap.
White House estimates of trust fund disbursements in 1984 for five Upper
Midwest states are shown n Table 2. Minnesota, for example, rece~ved about
1.77 percent of the funds from the 44 Turnback programs during the period
1979-81. This translates into an initial trust fund credit of $535 milllon.
However, Minnesota is projected to gain $299 million from the 5wap program.
As a result, the actual trust fund distribution to Minnesota would be $236
milllon ($535 million less $299 million net savings from the Swap). Iowa,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wlsconsln would receive $330 million, $83
million, $124 million, and $235 million, respectively, from the trust fund.
South Dakota 1s unique among the Upper Midwest states in that its trust
fund allocation would be increased because the cost of assuming Food Stamps
and AFDC would be greater than the savings from federal assumption of Medicaid.
Trust fund allocations for the other four states would all be reduced re-
flecting expected savings from the Swap program. Nationally, 23 states would
have their trust fund allocations supplemented to take account of additional
costs while 27 states and the District of Columbia would have trust fund
rwenues cut. New York’s cut ($2.3 billion) would be the largest, wh~le
Florida ($281 million) would receive the largest supplement.
From 1984 through 1987 the trust fund would be fully funded from federal
taxes. Each state could choose to take Its share of the trust fund m the11
Table 2
Impact of Proposed New Federalism Plan
on Upper Midwest States, 1984.
SWAP Turnback Program
Public As- Net Financing
Medicaid sistance Differ- Cost Net From Trust
Savlngs cost ence s~~ Fund
------------------------ $ million --------------------
MINNESOTA 501 202 299 535 299 236
Iowa 166 140 26 356 26 330
North Dakota 45 20 24 107 24 83
South Dakota 32 33 -1 123 -1 124
Wisconsin 633 296 337 572 337 235
Source: White House12
form of “Super Revenue Sharing” where, aside from a requirement to pass through
certain funds to local government, it
sees fit. Or, a state could continue
back programs, complying with federal
had in the past. The grants received
share of the trust fund. During this
harmless period” -- the trust fund is
would be free to use the funds as It
to apply for grants under the 44 Turn-
admlnistrative regulations just as it
would be deducted from the state’s
phase of the transition -- the “hold
a balancing device which insures
no state gains or loses from the Swap.
In 1988 the option of using the federal administrative structure
would be removed and the 44 aid programs abol~shed. Any state wishing
that
to
offer a particular type of ald to individuals or localities would be free to
do SO. It would, however, need to establish its own admmistratxve appar-
atus and obligate xts own funds for that actlvlty.
States would still share in the federal trust fund after 1987, but the
size of the trust fund would diminish. Tax rates on each of the federal
excise taxes would be reduced to zero over four years, and the federal gaso-
llne tax would fall to $.02 per gallon. Contributions from the federal wind-
fall profits tax to the trust fund would also drop accordingly. During this
period states could raise their exc~se taxes to replace the federal tax cuts.
By 1991 the President’s program would be fully in place. The 44 Turnback
programs would have been removed from the federal budget as would Food Stamps
and AFDC. Federal excise taxes on alcohol, telephones, and tobacco would no
longer exist, and the federal gasollne tax would be $.02 per gallon. States would
no longer have responsibility for Medlcald; and they could,lf pol~tically feasible,
have increased thexr excise taxes m an amount equal to the federal tax de-
crease. Each state would have the freedom to continue AFDC, Food Stamps, and
any or all of the Turnback programs using their own funds and management rules.13
The Admmistration estimates that, m the absence of the New Federal-
ism, about $30 bdlion would be spent by the federal government on the 44
Turnback programs in 1984. Th~s estimate assumes a decline m federal spend-
ing for these programs between 1982 and 1984. Funding for the programs,
with this assumption, not only would fail to keep up with inflation, it
would also decline in absolute terms. Obligations for the Turnback programs
in 1982 were estimated at slightly more than $31 billion by the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations. Our own
federal outlays for the same programs in 1980
billion.
rough estimates indicate that
totaled slightly more than $43
The magnitude of the expected reduction is more clearly visible when
expressed in real (1980) dollars (see Table 3). Between 1980 and 1982
spending on these programs declined by nearly 27 percent m nominal terms
more than 40 percent in real terms. Using the Administration’s inflation
and
pro-
jections of 5.1 percent for 1982 and 4.7 percent for 1983, expenditures of
30.2 billion in 1984 would reflect a 47 percent decrease m real expenditures
for those programs from 1980 to 1984.
expenditure levels causes a continued
federal level. Making a conservative
Fixing the trust fund at projected 1984
decline m real expenditures at the
assumption of a 4 percent inflation rate,
for Illustrative purposes, from 1984 through 1987, the end
less period, real revenues to support these programs would
about 45 percent of their 1980 expenditure levels by 1988,
of the hold harm-
have fallen to
or about three-
fourths their 1982 levels. Thus, state programs will be held harmless only
in terms of nominal dollars; there will be significant losses in real terms.
NET FISCAL IMPACT ON MINNESOTA
Projecting the unpact of the New Federalism on Minnesota state government
is difficult. Assumplklons about future funding levels for mdivldual programs.14
Table 3
Funding Levels for Turnback Programs Assumed
in Administration Estimates.
Fiscal
Year Current Dollars 1980 Dollars
-------- --
1980 outlays “ 43.1
1982 obligations ~’ 31.1
3/
1984 estimates – 30.2
4/






1/ Computed using 1980 federal outlays data. —
gl Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations “Staff Briefing
Report on ‘New Federalism’ Initiatives,” pp. 6-7.
~1 OffIce of Management and Budget, Major Themes and Additional Budget
Details, Fiscal Year 1983, p. 21.
~/ Assumes annual inflatlon rate of 4 percent, 1984-1988.15
rates of increase for certain expenditures, and the rate of growth of the
federal excise tax base are crucial to any estimates. These are, of course,
Items over which reasonable people can disagree. As a result, the simulation
results discussed below are offered as general indications of the effect of
the President’s proposal, not estimates of the specific dollar amounts of
the state’s gain or
tenuous since even
particular program,
loss. Projections for 1991 and beyond are particularly
slight differences in the assumed growth rates for a
such as Medicaid, can compound over time into a large
absolute error. Nonetheless certain impacts of the proposed New Federalism
on Minnesota are clear.
Alternative projections of the net fiscal impact of the New Federalism
proposal on Minnesota are given in
about 1984 spending levels and the
Stamps, AFDC, and Turnback program
Tables 4 to 6. White House assumptions
annual growth rates for Medzcald, Food
expenditures are used in Table 4. Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) assumptions about growth rates are used in
Table 5, while Table 6 uses 1982 authorizations inflated to 1984 levels and
CBO assumptions about rat@s Qf increase. Impact estunates are provided for
the first 10 yeans of the program in all three simulations.
Minnesota realizes no net gain or loss during the first four yeans of
the New Federalism program under any set of assumptions, consistent with the
nature of the hold harmless period. Once the trust fund phase-out begins,
however, differences are noticeable. In 1988, under White House assumptions
(Table 4), Minnesota begins to gain more from the new excise taxes and the
savings from the Swap program than the Administration projects it would cost
to maintain the 44 Turnback programs. In 1991, when the trust fund 1s fully
phased out, New Federalism would have a positive fiscal impact on Minnesota’s
budget of $387 million. From then on, savings to the state continue to n-
crease by an amount equal to the annual Increase in Medicaid costs less the
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By 1993, the tenth year of operation, the sum of the savings from the
Swap program and the additional excise collections replacing those former-
ly levied at the federal level is projected to exceed the added cost
of the programs turned back to the state by more than $500 million. Savings
accruing to the state from the Swap program would amount to nearly $900
million by 1993 while the additional excise taxes levied would total more than
$200 million. The cost of Turnback programs to be assumed by the stabe was
estimated by the White House to be $535 million,leaving a net reduction
in revenue needs of $563 million. The additional exc~se tax revenue by
itself, however, is only about 40 percent of the estimated cost of the Turn-
back programs in 1984.
These results indicate the substantial role of Medicaid savings in
the President’s program. Without the substantial projected savings from the
Food Stamp/AFDC-Medicaid Swap, most states would see negative fiscal impacts
once the trust fund was phased out. Minnesota, without those savings, would
be short about $325 mdlion even if there were no increase m Turnback pro-
gram expenditures from 1984 levels.
Simulations of the New Federalism’s unpact on Minnesota state finances
using alternative assumptions about 1984 expenditure levels and growth rates
are shown in Table 5. These results support the position that changes in
growth rate assumptions are not critical to the long term financial impact of
the program on the state’s finances. All that is required is that Medicaid
costs mcreasemuchmore rapidly than Food Stamp and AFDC costs.
Results less favorable for Minnesota are obtained when initial levels
for Medicaid, Food Stamps, AFDC, and Turnback programs are based on expected
1982 outlays, and then increased at the rates assumed in CBO projections
(Table 6). Under these assumptions Minnesota suffers negat~ve fiscal impacts
of $111 million, $140 milllon, and $4o milllon in 1988, 1989, and 1990)20
respectively. Even under this scenario, however, Minnesota would have a




indicate that the proposed New Federalism program
state government in the long run. Savings available
of Medicaid would be large compared to the proJected
costs of the Food Stamp, AFDC and Turnback programs. These favorable re-
14/
suits will not be found m most other states, however.—
Minnesota’s benefits may be largely illusory though. They depend
heavily on the assumption that the federal Medicaid program will maintain
the current benefit structure for Minnesotans. Medicaid outlays in 1980 were
$1,817 per recipient m Minnesota--58 percent ($670) above the average of
states of $1,147.”’ Only one other state, New York, had a higher aver-
age outlay per recipient ($1,985). The federal government would probably
enact national benefit levels lower than those prevailing in Minnesota.
all
Raising all states to the benefit levels of Minnesota would likely be viewed
as prohibitively expensive, especially m a period of great concern over
federal budget deficits.
Any reduct~on of Medicaid benefits from prevailing state levels would
reduce Medicaid savings to Minnesota citizens and thereby les.aenthe net
14/ .
15/ —
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
preliminary analysis of the Admmistration’s
.
Relations (ACIR), in its
programs (“Staff Brief.n~
Report”, ~ cit.) notes the generally unfavorable outlook for the st~tes
saying that “even if the Admin~strat~on’s budget assumpt~ons for AFDC,
Food Stamps, and Medicaid prove correct, the Admin~stration’s proposal
would result in a small shortfall (for states) beginning in 1989 and
lasting through 1992. ... If the alternative set of budget assumptions
is the basis for the simulation, the prognosis for the states 1s bleaker.
The shortfall would be significantly larger (17.6 bill~on in 1991)
and last longer.”
ACIR, “Staff Briefing Report”, ~ cit., p. 3-16.21
benefit of the Swap. The response of state policymakers to federal reduc-
tions in Medicaid payments in Minnesota would determine which citizens
would bear the burden. If the state chose to supplement federal funds
in order to maintain benefit levels, Minnesota taxpayers would find their
tax burden rising above that implicit in the Reagan proposal. If the
state chose not to supplement federal Medicaid funds, letting benefit
levels fall, Medicaid recipients would bear the burden. In that situation
the state budget would benefit, but there would be increased costs for
certain Minnesota residents, canceling or offsetting some of the budget
savings. Such a transfer of financial responsibilities may Improve the
welfare of one group of
not help the state as a
would have been reduced
taxpayers, but only at a cost to others. It will
whole. If Minnesota’s benefit levels in 1980
to the level of average benefits for all states in
1980, the difference would have been about $218 million.
The New Federalism may also create hardships for some local govern-
ments. There are two potential difficulties. First, local Minnesota
governments help fund both Medicaid and AFDC. The state, in the context of
the New Federalism, could force some localities to Increase payments for AFDC
by more than their Medicaid savings. While local variation m Impact would
not affect the state governments balance sheet, local fiscal disparities
would arise.
The second potential problem for local governments emerges from the fact
that a number of the programs to be turned back to the state are programs
which send funds directly from the federal government to localities. Other
programs channel funds through the state to local governments. There are,
of course, obv~ous financial advantages to state governments if they can
abandon such programs as Urban Development Action Grants or mass transit22
subsidies, designed to send money directly to localities.
The President’s proposal addresses this problem by requiring states which
opt out of programs designed solely for localities to pass along the entire
amount saved to local governments using the revenue sharing formula. In ad-
dition, to compensate for the loss of funds channeled through the states, 15
percent of all trust fund receipts are to be made available to local govern-
ment using the same revenue sharing formula.
Such provisions WI1l not ellminate inter-local losses and gains. Dis-
tributions based on the revenue sharing formula are likely to be quite dif-
ferent from the actual distribution of grant program funds. The f~rst im-
pression 1s that smaller local governments
larger urban centers are llkely to receive
percent passthrough is conditioned on the
appear to benefit, while the
less. In addition, since the 15
state’s receipts from the trust
fund and not on the original base m the trust fund (before deduction of the
savings from the Swap program), the amount mandated to go to localities drops
quickly, In the absence of state action, there is again the potential for a
transfer of financial difficulty from the state to its
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
The prospects for New Federalism may be usefully
variety of complementary perspectives. The historical





provides a more prescriptive perspective, attempting to answer the question,
“what should be done?” Political constraints, especially the degree of
popular acceptance, determine which alternatives are feasible.
Historical Context
New Federalism may be viewed as a response to a





federal fiscal role in state and local affairs during the 20 year
from 1960 to 1980 is well documented. Reasons most often g~ven to





The availability of revenue generated by the federal income tax from an
expanding base.
Willingness of politicians of both parties to use federal revenues and the
federal bureaucracy to address social and economic problems seen as in-
adequately addressed by states or local governments.
Strong state and local government lobbies in Washington.
A judicial system which, by a number of key decisions, contributed to a
collapse of constants on federal Involvement m matters previously con-
sidered state and local concerns.
No matter how long one’s llst of contributing factors might be or onets
choice of which one IS key, some reactions to the growing involvement of the
federal government in what had traditionally been state and local concerns
were becoming apparent well before the Reagan Administrat~on. Federal pro-
grama often were perceived as wasteful, inefficient, highly bureaucratized,
and simply not working. State and local officials urged removal of federal
conditions and regulations, arguing that they were costly, lacking flexibility
and burdensome. Many noted that the matching requirements of federal grant-
in-aid programs seriously distorted state and local spending patterns and pre-
ferences.
At the same time concerns were being expressed about the growth of the
federal budget, deficits, and tax burdens in an economy plagued by both infla-
tion and recession. The election of a conservative President, a Republican




conservative in outlook, made lt inevitable that mtergovern-
and a reexamination of the federal role would be on the
the 1980’s.24
During its first year, the Reagan Administration concentrated on tax
reductions and budget cuts. Cuts in federal grant-in-aid programs were
accompanied by grant consolidations (block grants) m some areas. The
New Federalism would make much more sweeping changes in the federal role
in providing revenue and services and in its relationships with states and
localities.
At this point, New Federalism is only a proposal. It has not been
introduced in the Congress in bill form. Given Its scope and complexity,
the proposal will be subjected to modification (or rejection) at many points
along its Congressional journey. Needless to say, there isa high level of
apprehension about potential differential impacts of changes m the federal
aid system upon states, local governments, regions, and economic groups. This
apprehension may make many pol~ticians hesitant to act.
Some observers even question the capacity of Congress to deal with
proposed policy changes of this magnitude. They argue that our political
process makes incremental change a much more likely possibility. The timing
of the President’s proposals may also pose a problem. There is a perception
that New Federalism is not the most unportant issue on the political agenda
at this tune. It is argued that this debate will only detract from con-
s~deration of more crucial issues such as federal budget deficits, economzc
recession, unemployment? shifts in taxpayer burdens, and spending levels
for defense and social welfare. Notwithstanding the fate of this partic-
ular set of proposals, it seems reasonable to expect some degree of change
m intergovernmental relationships.
Initial state and.local reactions to the New Federalism tended to be in
the form of questions about mediate financial Impacts? i.e., do we win or
lose relative to our posltlon under the current system? The prospect of
getting rid of federal mandates and regulations was attractive , Dut25
how many federal dollars would disappear as a result? The fiscal position
of many states (especially those not endowed with energy resources) has been
declining rapidly due to inflation, economic downturn, taxpayer revolts, and
cuts in federal aids. Many already find themselves in a position of raising
taxes and cutting programs. States are very concerned about their ability
to cope with federal aid cuts.
Another consideration involves the relationships between state govern-
ments and their local units. Under the existing system, the federal govern-
ment deals directly with local units in many programs. In some cases, new
federal block grants directed to the states would change thinsdirect rela-
tionship, and local units would find themselves dealing with state governments
for a share of these funds. State capitals could rapidly become the only
scene of the action for local officials. How would the states respond?
WouLd they attach conditions to their grants as onerous as they felt federal
conditions to be? What kinds of criteria would they use in determining which
functions should be state and which local? How would they allocate funds?
In most states, the executive branch has had major responsibility for
dealing with federal funds. Little discretion was Involved. Under the New
Federalism, this would change. There would be more opportun~ty for dis-
cretion on the part of the states. What role will state legislatures see for
themselves under these conditions?
Economics and the New Federalism
president Reagan’s New Federalism proposals are directly related
to the rationale for government provision of certain goods and services and
for government action to enhance the economy of the nation. Publlc pro-
grams are undertaken with the an of more nearly achieving three economic
goals: (1) growth with stable prices, (2) equity, and (3) efficiency.
Growth with stable prices enables an increasing standard of living26
for the average citizen. Equity reflects a concern that cltlzens should have
access to goods and services m a manner cons~stent with the moral standards
of society. Efficiency 1s the means towards greater productivity through
the best use of exlstmg resources. Some programs are directed towards a
single goal while others contribute to two, or even all three, goals.
Growth with Stable Prices: The pursuit of sustained economic growth
with little or no inflation is inherently a national function that requires
effectzve use of monetary and fiscal policy. Monetary policy us controlled
by national institutions, primarily the Federal Reserve System and the execu-
tive branch of the federal government. An effective fiscal policy requires
the flexibility to sustain deficits in periods of economic recession or
depression. State and local governments have much less flexibility with
regard to deficit spending than does the national government.
An important component of fiscal policy lS a set of programs which are
designed to be built-in stabilizers. The expenditure levels of these programs
tend to rise during periods of economic slowdown and to fall during periods
of economic prosperity. Stabilization programs should be financed at the
national level since effective implementation depends upon their expansion
during periods of economic slowdown. This will often lead to deficit spend-
ing, which is consistent with national but not state and local institutions.
Unemployment compensation is a major example of a built-in stabdizer. Other
transfer programs, such as Food Stamps, also play a role in meetmg the needs
of the cyclically poor.
State and local attempts to meet the needs of the cyclically poor are
frustrated by budget constraints. Their budget receipts are growing most
slowly, or even declining, in precisely those periods when the needs of the
unemployed are greatest. The frustration M especially acute when the problems27
in a state are caused largely by national policies -- for example, a rise in
the unemployment of construction workers due to high Lnterest rates caused
by national fiscal and monetary polic~es.
%!Q!.Y: Programs to enhance equity should be financed at the level of
government corresponding most nearly to the scope of the community within wh~ch
equity is a major concern. For example, shifting Food Stamps from a federally
financed program with uniform benefit schedules over the nation to a state
program is opposed by those who feel strongly that everyone in the nation
should be guaranteed equitable access to food. On the other hand, those who
feel equity within their own state is the major concern, leaving citizens of
other states to do as they please, should support a program administered at
the state level. For example, those who believe AFDC payments should reflect
local or state, rather than national, norms of well-being and self-sufficiency




programs to promote equity becomes more complex when mlgra-
Differences in program benefits between areas may lead
to migration of beneficiaries from low-benefit to high-benefit
The movement of people WLI1, in turn, lead to a greater burden
jurisdictions.
on the taxpayers
of the receiving jurisdiction and a lesser burden on the taxpayers of the
sending jurisdiction. Citizens of the send~ng jurmdiction are “free riders”
who experience the benefits of seeing needy people receive aid without paying
taxes comparable to taxes elsewhere. Thus, people who are concerned about
equity only within their own locallty may nevertheless support program imple-
mentation at a broader level of government to eliminate the potential of an
influx of potential beneficiaries.
Efficiency: To the extent that certain goods and services can be more
efficiently provided by the public rather than the private sector, two28
factors play a crucial role m
between levels of government:
determining the efflclent allocation of programs
(1) regional variations m cltlzen preferences
for public services and (2) the geographic extent of the impact of public
programs.
Regional variations in cltlzen preferences for publicly provided goods
and services should be reflected in the number and size of programs. A
program should be sufficiently decentralized that citizen groups with
marked differences in preferences are not forced to abide by the same policles.
The incluslon of Community Education funds in the Turnback program, for exam-
ple, probably reflects a judgment that communities differ in their desire
for this program and that an overall national pollcy is inappropriate amidat
such diversity.
The geographic extent of program impacts is the other critical var~able.
A program should be structured m such a way that effected citizens have a
voice m pollcy formation and program funding.
The possibility of migration creates a potential for greater efficiency
where service levels vary between jurisdictions. Citizens will tend to move
into jurisdictions supplying public services at levels they desme. ThuS ,
migration has some tendency to bring about greater homogeneity within juris-
dictions as time passes and, consequently, greater efficiency.
The argument concerning mlgratlon is valid only for services without
significant impacts beyond the jurisdiction in which they are provided.
If spillovers or externalities exist, jurisdictions have an lncentlve to seek
“free rider” status. Free riders reduce efficiency and undermme equity
goals. Efficiency losses derive from the unwillingness of taxpayers to pay
for benefits received by non-paying citizens of other jurisdictions. The
result is underfunding of programs with positive spillovers. Similarly,29
programs with negative spillovers are overfunded by the Jurlsdictlons
making the program declslons.
The existence of splllovers, positive and negative, between juris-
dictions provides a rationale for a shared responsibility for programs. To
proceed otherwise would lead to efficiency losses. A push to assign all
programs uniquely to one level of government as part of “bringing order” to
the system would lead to many inappropriate incentives. For example, a
project which reduced water pollution in a stream might have the largest
impact on the citizens in the county where the pollutant source is located,
a smaller impact on other citizens of the state, and a still smaller -- but
positive -- impact on other citizens of the nation. The appropriate method
of financing the proJect would be for each governmental level to contribute
m proportion to the benefits received by its citizens.
A further complication is introduced by the realitles of program im-
plementation. Large, centralized bureaucracies are often plagued by admin-
istrative and representational weaknesses. Partial control of professional
and bureaucratic interests is sometimes facilitated by decentralization.
Comparisons, and even competition, among multiple bureaucracies in dif-
ferent jurisdictions encourages more innovation and experimentation than
occurs in one federal program.
Popular Acceptance
Popular acceptance of President Reagan’s New Federalism proposal will
depend largely on whether it is perceived to be fair. The program’s fairness




federal and state governments wIII be necessary, as will pro-
state from any significant losses from changes m program
Large negative impacts for local governments, reClplentS of30
substantial sums from the Turnback program, will not promote popular accep-
tance, nor will a program which is only superficially fair -- for example,
one which is balanced during its early years but which may have costs far
in excess of revenues in the future. Finally, if the proposal achieves
its objectives at the expense of one or more groups of citizens, part~cu-
larly if those citizens are among society’s disadvantaged, it is not likely
to develop the support necessary for Congressional approval.
The Reagan proposal appears to produce no serious financial problems
for any level of government if two conditions are met. The first is that
Interstate differences m Medicaid benefit levels are resolved so that no
state 1s penalized for being either above or below average in its pre-
Swap benefits schedule. The second is that Administration projections of
the relative rates of growth of expenditures on Medicaid, Food Stamps,
AFDC, and the Turnback programs are relatively accurate.
Individual states are protected during the four-year, hold harmless
period by the balancing effect of the trust fund distributions. Local govern-
ments, while not held harmless individually, are protected by the Administra-
tion’s requirement that states which choose to opt out of programs designed
solely for localities must pass along to local governments the entire amount
saved. In addition, to compensate for the loss of funds formerly channeled
through the states, 15 percent of all trust fund receipts are also to be made
available to local governments. Both mandatory passthroughs are to be made
using the general revenue sharing formula.
Such provisions will protect localities as a group through 1987, but
they will not eliminate inter-local gains and losses. D~strlbutions based
on the revenue sharing formula are likely to be quite different from current
receipts of funds from grant programs. Smaller local governments appear likely31
to benefit from this shift, while the larger urban centers are Ilkely to
lose.
In 1988, when states have full responsibility for the Turnback
the distribution of funds is likely to change again. At that tune,




would have had four years to make their needs known to then state legisla-
tures.
There are no built-in surprises for state budgets during the first ten
years of the program if White House estimates of growth rates for Food Stamp,
AFDC, and Turnback programs are correct. Even increasing the rate at which
expenditures on the Turnback programs are assumed to grow from O percent (the




states such as Minnesota.
But the President’s proposal offers only partial protection against increases
program costs due to general inflation. Savings from federal assumption
Medicaid are likely to continue to grow, but the tax revenue from assump-
tion of federal excise taxes w~ll not. Excise taxes are levied on a per unit
basis and not as a percentage of the value of the item taxed. Consequently,
these revenues are expected to remain relatively constant, no matter what
happens to inflation. As a result, the New Federalism is not without risk to
the states. Inflation -- which forces AFDC, Food Stamp, and Turnback program
costs to increase more rapidly than projected -- could create financial hardships.
The fatrness of President Reagan’s proposal to low income famil~es and the
disadvantaged is the most difficult to evaluate. The program’s announcement
noted that welfare recipients would be protected during the transition from
federal to state control of welfare programs, but no specific mechanism was
given. Without information about what is actually planned, no conclusions can
be reached. The Administration must, however, solve two separate problems,32
each of which will require imaginative solutions if the New Federalism is
not to take funds away from the less fortunate.
Frost, some way must be found to insure that states maintain mmimum
standards for public assistance programs. Cutting program benefits (or
simply not increasing them at the rate at which prices increase) could pro-
vide significant savings for state government at the expense of public assis-
tance recipients.
The second problem appears even more troublesome -- It is flndlng a
way to resolve Interstate differences in Medicaid benefits so that no
state, nor any individual in those states, is penallzed by the federal
takeover of Medicaid. This problem is particularly disquieting since full
federal assumption of Medicaid costs IS what frees up most of the funds that
states are to use to pay for the AFDC, Food Stamp, and Turnback programs.
If the Medicaid problem cannot be resolved, the President’s New Federalism
proposal is not likely to be approved by Congress.
Briefly, the dilemma is this. The federal government can choose to
fund Medicaid at a high level (equivalent to the benef~t schedule for Minne-
sota or New York, for example) and deduct the excess given to residents
of the states with lower benefit levels from the State’s share of the t’rust
fund. This has the effect of forcing the low benefit states to levy additional
taxes to fund the Turnback programs. In practice low Medicaid states are also
often those with low fiscal capacity. The
additional costs on state governments, and
states.
result is a program which places
thus on taxpayers, in low Medicaid
An alternative 1s to set a low Medicaid payment level. Then states such
as Minnesota would be faced with the choice of either mstitutlag a supple-
mentary program and raising taxes to pay for the program level which they had33
before, or of letting the burden fall on Medicaid recipients.
Choice of a middle level of benefits reduces the absolute loss for
states of either extreme. This does not, however, solve the problem. In-
stead,both high and low Medicaid states are losers.
There is another alternative under which each state is given credit for
its existing level of Medicaid spending and a special federal program, out-
side the New Federalism ProPosals is used to bring low Medicaid states up to
some predetermined level. This approach retains the inter-state equity of
the New Federalism program, but it adds considerably to the federal budget.
None of these sunple alternatives appears to be a satisfactory way of
handling the Medicaid problem. If a solution cannot be found, however, it
is not likely there will be any enthusiasm among state officials for the






1. Rehabilitation Services -- Basic
A
Turned Back to States
Support
2. Rehabilitation Services -- Special Programs
3. Rehabilitation Services -- Innovation and Expansion
4. Rehabilitation Training
5. Centers for Independent Living
Vocational and Adult Education:
1. Vocational Education -- Basic Grants to States
2. Vocational Education -- Consumer and Humanity Education
3. Vocational Education -- Program Input and Support Services
4. Vocational Education -- Program Input Projects
5. Vocational Education -- -SpecialPrograms for D~sadvantaged
6. Vocational Education -- State Advisory Councils
7. Vocational Education -- Programs for Indian Tribes and Indian
Organizations
8. Vocational Education -- State Planning and Evaluation
9. Community Education
10. Adult Education -- State Administrative Programs
11. Adult Education -- Adult Immigrants
12. Emergency Adult Education for Indochina Refugees
13. Adult Indian Education
State Education Block Grant:
CETA :
1. Comprehensive Employment and Training Programs
2. Job Corps
3. Institutional Grant Programs
4. Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers
5. Employment and Training -- Research and Development Projects
6. Employment and Training -- Indians and Native Americans
7. Special National Programs and Activities for the Disadvantaged
Work Incentive Program (wIN):
INCOME ASSISTANCE
Low Income Home Energy Assistance:
SOCIAL, HEALTH AND NUTRITION SERVICES
Child Nutrition:
1. School Breakfast Program
2. Equipment Assistance for School Food Service Programs
3. Special Milk Program for Children
4. State Administrative Expenses for Child Nutrition35




Child Abuse and Neglect -- Prevention and Treatment:
Social Services Block Grant:
Legal Services:
Community Services Block Grant:
Health Prevention Block Grant:
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Block Grant:
Primary Care Block Grant:
Maternal and Child Health Block Grant:
Primary Care Research and Development:
Special Benefits for Disabled Coal Miners:
Migrant Health Centers Grants:
Family Planning:

















1. Urban Mass Transit -- Capital Improvement Grants
2. Urban Mass Transit -- Operating Assistance, Formula Grants
Water and Sewer:
1. Economic Development Admmistration -- Grants
2. Econom~c Development Administration -- Loans
3. EPA Waste Water Treatment Grants
Community Facilities Loans (Farmers Home Administration):
Community Development Block Grants:
1. CDBG
2. State CDBG
Urban Development Action Grants:
REVENUE SHARING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Occupational Safety and Health Technical Assistance:
General Revenue Sharing:
Source: ACIR, “Staff Briefing Report,” ~ cit., pp. 6-6 through 6-1o.37
APPENDIX TABLE B
Taxes Going to Federalism
Telephone Excise Tax:
Trust Fund
rate 1% on all phone service (scheduled to expire in 1984)


























Approximate revenue $2.7 billlon
Gasoline Excise Tax
rate: $.04 per gallon
(one-half or $.02 would go to federal~sm trust fund)
Approximate revenue $2.2 billlon
Windfall Profits Tax: #
rate: lev~ed at varying percentages of the difference between sales
price and recovery price for oil. Tax IS required to be
phased out between January, 1988 and January, 1991, depending
on when the total tax collections exceed $227.3 billion.
Recovery pr~ce for oil adjusted quarterly to take account of
inflatlon.
Approximate revenue: $16.7 billion38
APPENDIX TABLE C
Current Minnesota Excise Taxes on Telephones, Alcohol, Tobacco. and Gasoline.




























Total New Revenue $213,000,000
Cost of Turnback programs $535,000,000
Net long term deficit in funds to State ,$327.000,000
without SWAT program
Based on 1980 fiscal data from Minnesota.